U.S. Nonproliferation Commitments and Goals

Appendix II

President Clinton, on September 27, 1993, established specific U.S. policy objectives regarding all Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and the means to deliver them, and stated that the Administration's pursuit of these objectives is to be guided by three major considerations:

- National security requires according a higher priority to nonproliferation, and to making it an integral element of our relations with other countries.
- The United States will actively seek expanded trade and technology exchange with nations, including former adversaries, that abide by global nonproliferation norms that will strengthen U.S. economic growth, democratization abroad, and international stability.
- The United States needs to build a new consensus – embracing the Executive and Legislative branches, industry and public, and friends abroad – to promote effective nonproliferation efforts and integrate our nonproliferation and economic goals.

The President reaffirmed U.S. support for a strong, effective nonproliferation regime that enjoys broad multilateral support and employs all the means at U.S. disposal to advance U.S. objectives. Consistent with the nuclear nonproliferation principles presented above, the President's policy sets the following priorities for nuclear nonproliferation with regard to fissile materials and international nonproliferation regimes.

- Address the growing accumulation of fissile materials from dismantled nuclear weapons and civil nuclear programs, by seeking to eliminate where possible the accumulation of stockpiles of HEU and plutonium, and ensuring that existing stocks of these materials are subject to the highest standards of safety, security, and international accountability.
- Promote treaty or treaties prohibiting the production of HEU or separation of plutonium for nuclear explosives or outside of international safeguards (such as the potential Fissile Material cut-off Treaty).
- Encourage more restrictive regional arrangements to constrain fissile material production in regions of instability and high proliferation risk.
- Make U.S. fissile material that is no longer needed for defense available to safeguarding by the IAEA, consistent with plans for treatment, storage, and disposition.
- Explore means to limit the stockpiling of plutonium from civil nuclear programs and seek to minimize the civil use of HEU.
- Initiate a comprehensive review of long-term options for plutonium disposition, taking into account technical, nonproliferation, environmental, budgetary, and economic considerations.
- Pursue policy not to encourage the civil use of plutonium in an open cycle or engage in plutonium reprocessing, but to maintain existing commitments in Western Europe and Japan.
- Strengthen the IAEA ability to detect clandestine nuclear activities.
- Adhere to voluntary safeguards offers.
- Ensure that the IAEA has the resources needed to implement its vital safeguards responsibilities.

The Department's Annual Performance Plan for FY 2001 specifically includes the following nonproliferation and national security strategic objectives:

- Provide policy leadership, technology development, and program implementation to prevent the proliferation of WMD; detect WMD proliferation; monitor WMD treaties and agreements; improve international nuclear safety, security, and accounting of weapons-usable nuclear materials; and counter WMD terrorism.
- Reduce inventories of U.S. and Russian excess weapons fissile materials in a transparent and irreversible manner.
- Provide the U.S. Navy with safe, militarily effective nuclear propulsion plants, and ensure their continued safe and reliable operations.
- Ensure the security of the Department's nuclear materials, facilities, and information assets.

The Department uses a process of extensive program reviews to evaluate progress against established plans and milestones in support of international treaties and agreements and, in some cases, bilateral or multilateral committees review the operations and responsibilities under these treaties and agreements and/or international commitments. These committees typically review cost, schedules, and status reporting in addition to technical review and program operations.

In addition to the interagency roles noted above, the Department performs nonproliferation assessments for Records of Decision on management of nuclear materials at the Department's domestic facilities. In these assessments, specific technical and policy factors guide Department decision making. For example, the metrics used for the final decision on storage

of weapons-usable fissile material and excess disposition included the following:

Technical Factors

- Degree to which the disposition options result in forms that meet the spent fuel standard.
- Until final disposition occurs, the degree to which storage options meet the "stored weapons standard."
- Time to implement option, to determine how soon non-proliferation benefits can be achieved.
- Degree to which the option permits international monitoring to confirm U.S. commitments while still protecting sensitive information and facilities (i.e., "managed access").
- Storage options should provide high levels of security to prevent theft of nuclear materials and should provide access to international monitors.
- To the extent possible, excess weapons materials in storage should be available for bilateral U.S.-Russian monitoring and IAEA safeguards, while protecting proliferation-sensitive information.
- Degree of transparency to domestic and international community in the Department's management of materials, facilities, and processes in the nuclear fuel cycle.
- Degree of irreversibility of processes for arms reduction.
- Degree to which options encourage/enable international cooperative development and testing of transparency measures to be used by other countries.
- Degree to which short-term risks introduced by increased transportation and processing of materials are compensated for by the long-term nonproliferation benefits.

Policy Factors

- Impact on similar materials management programs internationally, particularly in Russia.
- Effect on nuclear arms reduction efforts, including the extent to which U.S. decisions ensure the irreversibility of the arms reduction process.
- Impact on fuel cycle policy and choices by other nations, especially with regard to excess stockpiles of weapons-usable fissile material.
- Political implementability of each option.

U.S. Nonproliferation Policy: Implementation by the Department

Many Federal offices and agencies have a role in implementing U.S. nonproliferation policy. These include several White House offices; traditional national security elements in the intelligence community and at the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy (including the national laboratories); as well as the Departments of Justice, Commerce, Treasury, Health and Human Services, and Agriculture. The Federal Government's approach to combating the proliferation of WMD depends on an effective interagency process among these many offices and agencies.

Within the Department of Energy, NN is the lead decision unit for activities and programs that support U.S. arms control and nonproliferation policies, goals, and objectives, as well as statutorily mandated activities. The office provides leadership and representation for the Department in the international arms control and nonproliferation community and the U.S. Government's interagency process, as well as for the U.S. Government in national and international arms control and nonproliferation negotiations, agreements, and interactions. NN is also responsible within the Department for technology development and program implementation to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, detect nuclear proliferation, monitor nonproliferation and arms control treaties and agreements, and improve transparency technologies for managing the back end of the fuel cycle during storage and final disposal in a geologic repository. MD will continue to look for opportunities in all nuclear materials management programs to demonstrate transparency and to showcase state-of-the art materials protection, control, and accounting technologies to the international community.

Implementation Considerations for Departmental Nuclear Materials Management – Opportunities for Leadership

In September 1993, Present Clinton announced that the United States would place material identified as excess to defense needs under IAEA safeguards. During 1994 and 1995, the IAEA began safeguarding approximately 10 tons of HEU at the Y-12 facility at Oak Ridge, and approximately a ton of plutonium each at the Hanford and Rocky Flats sites. At the September 1996 IAEA General Conference, Energy Secretary O'Leary committed the United States to place an additional 26 tons of material under IAEA safeguards by September 1999. Other recent

developments regarding IAEA safeguards in the United States include the placing of the Portsmouth and Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plants and WIPP on the list of facilities eligible for safeguards under the voluntary offer, and monitoring by the IAEA of the blend-down of HEU from Kazakhstan. These voluntary offers have enhanced U.S. leadership in nonproliferation efforts, and enable the United States to influence the adoption of new standards for state-of-the-art safeguards technologies by the IAEA.

Every Departmental program involved in nuclear materials management offers similar opportunities for U.S. leadership in nonproliferation efforts. Specific nonproliferation treaties, agreements, and negotiations that are currently being supported by the Department include START III, a U.S.-Russia Plutonium Disposition Agreement, the HEU Purchase Agreement, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the U.S.-Russia-IAEA Trilateral Initiative, a potential Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Conversion, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the strengthened IAEA safeguards systems. These treaties and agreements will necessitate increases in managed access at Department facilities, transparency in the accountancy of domestic materials, physical protection, and verification measures of irreversibility of the arms reduction process. In some instances, new technical approaches may be required.